in the hands of prosperous persons, for whom the poor constitute workers. 423

The smaller the number of livestock, the more farming there is. 311 /103/ Since the time of famine in the year of the rabbit, (1) the

1. The famine of the winter of 1879-1880. For a description of this winter see Nos. 17 and 18 of the Turkestanskie Vedomosti, 1885, in the article by Aleksandrov: "Iz zhizni stepnykh uezdov Syr-Dar'inskoi Oblasti" /From life in the steppe uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast/. [731]

The cycle of twelve years, by which the Turks determine age and time elapsed, consist of the following names: 1) chichkan, mouse, 2) siir, cow, 3) bars, tiger, 40 koyan, rabbit, 5) ulu, crocodile, 6) dzhilan, snake, 7) dzhilky, horse, 8) koy, ram 9) meshin, monkey, 10) tauk, hen, 11) it, dog, and 12) tonguz, pig. [805]

nomads, realizing the lack of stability of livestock raising on the principles accepted by them, have turned to the production of supplies of grass in winter, and to agriculture.

For the damage of a hayfield from cattle grazing, according to Torgai, they pay the householder damages only if he himself has not ceased to use that hayfield. 685

If a man who is inscribed in another uyezd wishes to engage in agriculture in a strange pasture or a strange summer camp, the community to whom the land belongs demands rent from him for its use, the amount of which depends on the conditions. The person in question is forbidden to plant trees and to build. But as soon as he is inscribed in that uyezd and volost where his tilled land is, the land becomes his property and he pays the usual tributes (chubauz) and dues. 427 423

Swampy places (tugai), overgrown with rushes, etc. are still not sold, since they are widespread. Nevertheless they are becoming more and more associated with the person who winters in them and has stores of hay, with which he frequently leaves people during the summer. Persons of outside communes are not admitted to these winter camps. In case of misunderstandings, these persons pay money for the fodder under foot - chubauz (Perovsk uyezd).

To put through a new canal, one or more workers, depending on the amount of work, come out from each tent of the group of ten, group of fifty, or of the village or in general that group of people 425 476 312

[151 cont.]
175 raids of the Kazaks. The Volga Kalmuks, the Bashkirs, and
721 the Siberian Cossacks began to attack again with more strength
726 than ever. Galdan Tsyren could not watch the ruin of the old enemies of his people with composure, nor leave unavenged the aggressions and wrongs which his ancestors had been obliged to endure for more than a century. After having delivered several terrible blows against them, he [152] seized Turkestan, the capital of their khans, in 1723 (1), in addition to Tashkent and Sairam,

1. Nepluev and Rychkov, in their reports written from Orenburg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often say that Abulkhair lived in Turkestan until 1723, at which time he was driven out by the Dzungars.

and finally he brought several branches of the Great Horde and the Middle Horde completely under his rule.

[722] A similar fate awaited all the other Kirghiz-Kaisaks [Kazaks], who were pressed and pursued from all sides, and they might have been completely exterminated if they had not retreated to the south. The remnants of the Great Horde and a small part of the Middle Horde fell back toward Khodzhent /Leninabad/, most
175 of the Middle Horde retreated to Samarkand, and the Little Horde
167 moved to Khiva and the realm of Bukhara (2). These migrations
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2. This is what the famous elder of the Middle Horde, Bukenbai, said to Tevkelev when they met in Orsk in 1748, and he added: "At that time we fled before the Kalmuks, the Siberian and the Yaik /Ural/ Cossacks, and the Bashkirs like hares before the hounds."

brought inevitable ruin and disaster in their wake. The herds and the studs dwindled from one day to the next, and misfortune and misery befell everyone, some died of hunger, and others abandoned

[152 cont.]
175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugutives halted, but in
[167 barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
731] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situation for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[646] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general assembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies, and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
[643 each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the statistical section of this book, for more details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands, they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

the Soviet Union. Traditionally, peoples of Central Asia were able to leave their native pastures when times were bad and claim hospitality among other more fortunate Turkic groups. Instances have been reported in the 19th and 20th centuries of groups of Kazakhs whose herds had been depleted through drought or plague doing this; some even joined Uzbek groups, on the basis of descent from a common ancestor. Such an argument would hold only for the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpaks. It is not applicable to the Tadzhiks, and certainly not to the Russians. According to a long-established cultural pattern, Kazakhs who leave herding for farming join another group, such as Sart, for example, or Karakalpak, according to the area in which they have settled.

The general consideration of shifts in ethnic identification raises the problem of the smaller peoples of Central Asia. Aside from the many millions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirgiz, there are various small groups, none of which number more than fifty-odd thousand. These smaller groups, who together number about one quarter of a million people, have suffered the same fate of cultural levelling, absorption, and elimination of cultural differences that has taken place throughout the Soviet world from the Caucasus to the Bering Sea. The cost of administering many small peoples is too great a luxury for the USSR to afford; the Soviets have ceased to regard these peoples as independent entities, and have awarded the highest honors to those ethnologists who have justified the formation of ever larger groups of peoples.

In 1926 more than 200,000 Kazakhs lived within the 1939 boundaries of Uzbekistan, exclusive of the Karakalpak ASSR, and 86,000 Kazakhs were living in what is today Karakalpakia. The Karakalpaks are a people closely related to the Kazakhs; they are in the main Kazakhs who a few centuries ago settled down to farming. They still maintain strong ethnic ties to the Kazakhs, and linguistically are barely distinguishable from them. The Karakalpaks increased from 146,000 to 186,000 between 1926 and 1939, an increase of 27 per cent and the highest gain of all the Central Asiatic peoples during that period. Part of this gain may have been due to the decision of Kazakhs to declare themselves Karakalpaks, or the decision of the census authorities to list the Kazakhs as Karakalpaks. The latter alternative is implausible, because it would have the Soviets contributing further to a population picture of the Kazakhs which was already unfavorable. Marxist theory rejects the capitalistic Malthusian concept, and extreme population losses are embarrassing for the Communists to explain.

From 1929 to 1933 the total livestock in Kazakhstan dropped from nearly 40,000,000 to 5,000,000 head. This was a disastrous blow to the nomads. The number of sheep and goats dropped by about 90 per cent. More than two-thirds of the horses and three-quarters of the cattle died in those years; between 1930 and 1933 more than 90 per cent of the camels died. Without these animals, the nomads cannot live. The farmer can store his grain, but the nomad can store food only on the hoof. When a head of stock dies on the steppes either it is eaten or it rots. The nomad's staple is milk, which he cannot store. These losses in livestock give some idea of the starvation conditions which prevailed during 1930-1933. Hundreds of thousands of nomads must either have

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

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The Kazakhs were collectivized more slowly than the Slavs. By 1930, the Pavlodar region, a Slavic farming area since the 19th century, was 76 per cent collectivized while the Guryev region, a Kazakh pastoral region, was only 44 per cent collectivized.[1] Progress on collectivization was slow both because Kazakh herders were among the strongest resisters to collectivization, and because their nomadic existance made the administrative problems in collectivizing them more difficult than for sedentary peoples.

Another indication of the severity of the impact of collectivization on the Kazakhs is seen in the rate of recovery. During the period including World War I, the Revolution, and the civil war, the Kazakhs suffered a number of heavy blows. They had their own revolution in 1916, which resulted in severe reprisals by the Tsarist enforcement agencies, and during 1917-1922 they suffered losses again. But during the 1920's they recovered to a point where the stock total exceeded that of 1917. Such was not the case in the period following collectivization, however; in 1953 the entire herding economy of Kazakhstan had not reached the position which it had attained in any one of the years in the 1927-1930 period. The Kazakhs in the 1920's demonstrated a resiliency and capacity to meet and overcome disasters, a capacity which is part of their very history as herders. Herding is an economy which has few shock absorbers; herders may easily be wiped out by a drought, a blizzard, or disease among their animals. Farmers have an ability to store against future need which the herders do not.

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The Kazakhs showed this resiliency during the first years of the Soviet era, in recovering from the civil war. But they have not recovered, even after 25 years, from collectivization. This loss of capacity to recover in the face of disasters is one indication of the collapse of the traditional Kazakh economy, and is related to a breakdown in the traditional form of the Kazakh society and culture.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE RURAL ECONOMY

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In 1952 and 1953, the leadership of the Kazakh Communist Party and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a series of statements indicating the grave situation in farming and herding in the republic.

It has already been stated that of three million hectares of land under irrigation, only 1,300,000 hectares, or 43 per cent, were actually in use. Afonov, until recently the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, attacked this situation in 1953 as a gross waste of resources.[2] In 1952, the same general criticism had been made in a somewhat different form. The then secretary of the Central Committee, and boss of the Kazakh Party, Shaiakhmetov, attacked the farmers of the southern regions of Kazakhstan, the Uzbeks, Taranchis, Dungans, and others, in Alma-Ata, Taldy-Kurgan, and Dzhambul, the leading agricultural regions of the republic. The principal charge

[1] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 211.
[2] Afonov, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 8 Oct 53.